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Background. The clinical attack rate of influenza is influenced by prior immunity and mixing patterns in the host population,
and also by the proportion of infections that are asymptomatic. This complexity makes it difficult to directly estimate R0 from
the attack rate, contributing to uncertainty in epidemiological models to guide pandemic planning. We have modelled
multiple wave outbreaks of influenza from different populations to allow for changing immunity and asymptomatic infection
and to make inferences about R0. Data and Methods. On the island of Tristan da Cunha (TdC), 96% of residents reported
illness during an H3N2 outbreak in 1971, compared with only 25% of RAF personnel in military camps during the 1918 H1N1
pandemic. Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) methods were used to estimate model parameter distributions. Findings. We
estimated that most islanders on TdC were non-immune (susceptible) before the first wave, and that almost all exposures of
susceptible persons caused symptoms. The median R0 of 6.4 (95% credibility interval 3.7–10.7) implied that most islanders
were exposed twice, although only a minority became ill in the second wave because of temporary protection following the
first wave. In contrast, only 51% of RAF personnel were susceptible before the first wave, and only 38% of exposed susceptibles
reported symptoms. R0 in this population was also lower [2.9 (2.3–4.3)], suggesting reduced viral transmission in a partially
immune population. Interpretation. Our model implies that the RAF population was partially protected before the summer
pandemic wave of 1918, arguably because of prior exposure to interpandemic influenza. Without such protection, each
symptomatic case of influenza would transmit to between 2 and 10 new cases, with incidence initially doubling every 1–
2 days. Containment of a novel virus could be more difficult than hitherto supposed.
Citation: Mathews JD, McCaw CT, McVernon J, McBryde ES, McCaw JM (2007) A Biological Model for Influenza Transmission: Pandemic Planning
Implications of Asymptomatic Infection and Immunity. PLoS ONE 2(11): e1220. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001220
INTRODUCTION
Reports of past influenza pandemics show marked variation in
clinical attack rates between populations. In the 1918–19 H1N1
pandemic, rates of clinical illness were less than 20% in some
urbanised communities, but morethan 60% in isolated communities
such as Western Samoa [1–4]. During the 1968 H3N2 pandemic,
attack rates in US households were limited to 30–40% [5], whereas
almost the whole population fell ill when the virus reached the
isolated island of Tristan da Cunha (TdC) in 1971 [6]. Biologically-
based models for pandemic influenza [1] that incorporate effects of
host immunity can help to explain such differences in observed
attack rates. Such models could also explain recurrent waves of
infection reported from 1918–19 [2–4] and 1968–71[6]. Higher
attack rates in isolated populations are most likely due to fewer past
exposures and lesser immune protection, leading to greater
susceptibility. Multiple waves could reflect rapid waning of immune
protection following exposure to a novel virus, antigenic drift [1,4],
seasonalinfluencesontransmissionofrespiratoryagents[7]oreffects
of social interventions [8].
Our flexible model, which we here apply to outbreaks of H3N2
from 1968–71 [6] and H1N1 from 1918 [2], allows for the
possibility of asymptomatic infection [4,9–11], for pre-existing
immunity [4,9,10] and for the waning of immune protection and/
or antigenic drift over time [1,4,10–12]. As the immune response
cumulates following repeated exposure to seasonal variants of
influenza [4,12], and wanes thereafter, protection tends to be
stronger in populations with a history of more recent exposure [4].
Our results also suggest that pre-existing immunity, arguably
induced by prior exposure to inter-pandemic influenza, provided
short-lived protection against the new pandemic virus of 1918.
Such cross-reactive (heterosubtypic) immunity [4,12–14] could
also be important in protecting global populations against H5N1
or any other pandemic virus that might emerge.
METHODS
Approach
Epidemic curves from single wave outbreaks with low rates of
symptomatic influenza provide little or no information to separate
the effects of viral exposure (and hence magnitude of R0) from the
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arbitrary outbreak can arguably be explained by either high
intensity exposure (high R0) with a high level of prior immunity or
a high rate of asymptomatic infection, or alternatively by a low R0
with less immunity, or by appropriate intermediate combinations
[1]. Furthermore, measurement of subtype-specific antibody, as in
a number of household and challenge studies [5,10,15] does not
provide information about heterosubtypic immune protection
induced by prior exposure to other subtypes [10,13]. Multiple-
wave outbreaks can provide more information about the in-
teraction between influenza and the host immune system [1],
particularly if there is evidence of repeated attacks in some
individuals (See Appendix S1). Furthermore, as asymptomatic
infection can induce immunity [9,10], the time course of an
outbreak also provides some information about asymptomatic
infection. Accordingly, we have used data on the incidence of
symptomatic influenza in two multiple-wave outbreaks of
pandemic influenza, on different time-scales, to make inferences
about asymptomatic infection, pre-existing levels of immunity, and
the rate of change of immunity following exposure to a new
pandemic strain. We chose not to use mortality or hospital
admissions data because of the additional uncertainties arising
from changes in virulence and incomplete reporting.
Sources of data
The population of Tristan da Cunha, a remote island in the South
Atlantic, had been free of influenza for 8–9 years when H3N2 was
introduced by ship from South Africa in 1971[6]. The resulting
epidemic curve over 50 days was based on reports of cases by day
of symptom-onset. In two waves, 96% of the population of 284 fell
ill; there were 365 recorded attacks, of which 312 could be
identified with a precise day of onset. 273/284 islanders
experienced a first attack of influenza, and 92/284 experienced
a second attack. Most second attacks coincided with the second
population wave; a minority of individuals experienced a first (and
only) clinical attack during the second wave, possibly following
asymptomatic infection during the first wave. Second attacks were
generally less severe. Two elderly persons died [6]. To test the
flexibility of the model to evaluate multiple wave behaviour over
alongertime-frame,wealsoexaminedweeklyreportsofnewcasesof
influenza among 180,000 personnel in RAF camps, providing
apparently unbiased incidence rates for symptomatic influenza over
32 weeks of the summer and autumn waves of the 1918–19 UK
pandemic [2]; data for the third (winter) wave were unavailable
because of post-war demobilisation. The cumulative incidence of
clinical illness was only 25% over the two waves of illness, arguably
because some RAF personnel in the UK were protected because of
prior seasonal exposure to interpandemic influenza.
Basic epidemic model
Fig. 1 shows our extended SEIRS model [16]. After exposure to
influenza virus, susceptible hosts (S) pass through two sequential
exposed states (E1 and E2) of latent infection, providing flexibility in
the distribution of the estimated time spent in the infective and
symptomatic state (I) that follows. The model also allows for
individuals with asymptomatic or unreported infection (A). A key
model assumption is that these two types of infections (A and I) occur
in proportion, which ensures that model behaviour is independent of
the degree of infectiousness of asymptomatic (A)c a s e s .F o r
mathematical simplicity, we may therefore consider the infectivity
of asymptomatic cases to be zero (See Appendix S1). (However, as A
cases become immune without being directly observed, the shape of
the incidence curve does provide information about the frequency of
A infections.) The recovered state (R) follows viral clearance from
both I and A states. Recovery is followed by longer-term immunity
(L) with formation or consolidation of ‘memory’ immune responses
in a proportion, or by a temporary state of protection or immunity
(T)inthe moreimmunologicallynaive,beforesubjects again become
susceptible (S) to re-infection. The full parameter set and the relevant
differential equations for the model are described in Appendix S1.
To explain the results in this main paper, we define:
R0=average number of secondary cases (I and A)f r o me a c h
infectious case (I and A) if all contacts are susceptible. If
asymptomatic infections do not transmit, itis easy to see that R0
istheaveragenumberofsecondarysymptomaticandinfectious
cases from each primary symptomatic and infectious case.
l=force of infection (See Appendix S1);
z=proportion of individuals susceptible (S) prior to the first
wave;
a=proportion of latent infections (E2) becoming infective
and symptomatic (I);
1–a=proportion of infections that are asymptomatic or
unreported (A);
2/c=Te=mean time in states of latent infection (E1 or E2);
2/w=Tw=mean time in resistant states (R or T);
1/u=Ti=mean time as I (infective) if symptomatic or as A if
asymptomatic;
r=proportion of resistant (R) developing longer-term
resistance (L);
Serial interval, doubling time and transmissions per
day
The mean generation time or serial interval for our SEIR model is
G=Te+Ti. The effective reproduction rate, Re, is defined as z.R0,
where z is the proportion initially susceptible. The initial doubling
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Figure 1. Flexible Influenza Model. Each compartment corresponds to a class of individuals in the population, and the arrows indicate the flows of
individuals from class to class over time. As a result of exposure to the force of infection (l), susceptible individuals (S) flow through two exposed
classes of latent infection (E1 and E2). A proportion (a) then become infective and symptomatic (I), and a proportion 1-a become asymptomatic (A).
Both I and A pass to the recovered class (R) from which a proportion r develop longer-lasting protection (L), while the remainder eventually return to
the susceptible class after passing through a temporary state (T).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001220.g001
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Heesterbeek [17]. The mean number of transmissions per day for
each transmitter in a fully susceptible population is estimated as
R0/Ti.
Model-fitting
We used MATLAB v7.3 to fit deterministic epidemic curves and
for Monte Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) simulations to estimate
parameter distributions; we used the negative binomial distribu-
tion to calculate each likelihood [18]. For TdC we fitted a prior
distribution for the latent period (normal distribution with a mean
of 1.25 days and variance of (0.3)
2 days) and serial interval (log
normal distribution with a mode of 2.6 days and variance of
(0.33)
2 days), based on estimates from the literature [1,19–22]. We
also used stochastic simulation, conditional on deterministic
parameters, to fit the Tristan da Cunha observations, and
construct empirical likelihoods. For the RAF simulations we fixed
both Ti and Te. More details are provided in Appendix S1.
RESULTS
Epidemic curve for Tristan da Cunha in 1971
Fig. 2 shows the model fit and Table 1 summarises the
corresponding parameter estimates and credibility intervals. The
results indicate that about 84% of islanders were susceptible before
the outbreak began (z=0.84, 95% credibility interval 0.62–0.99)),
as would be expected in a population that had been free of
influenza for 8–9 years. 96% of persons reported clinical influenza
in one or both waves [6]. Our model estimated that most islanders
were exposed twice and that almost all infections led to clinical
symptoms (a=0.91, (0.72, 1.00)). Inferred exposures in the first
wave on TdC led to protection of very short duration (median
12 days), allowing the second wave to cause (milder) second
infections in some of those previously affected [6]. The estimated
median infective period was 0.98 days (0.30, 1.83), and R0 found
support in the range 3.73–10.69 (Table 1).
Epidemic curve for RAF Camps in 1918
Due to the weekly reporting of influenza in RAF camps, our MCMC
algorithm was unable to distinguish between a range of possible
solutions, leading to wide credibility intervals on the estimates for most
parameters (See Appendix S1). For this reason, we fixed the latent
period (Te)a n dm e a ni n f e c t i o u sp e r i o d( Ti) to the posterior median
estimates from the TdC run. Fig. 3 shows the model fitted to the
summer and autumn waves with Te=1.3days and Ti=1.0days.
Table 1 summarises relevant parameter estimates. The results indi-
cate that only some 51% of RAF personnel were susceptible prior to
the first wave (z=0.51 (0.34, 0.65)), arguably because of recent
exposures to inter-pandemic influenza. Only 38% of exposures of
susceptible persons led to clinical symptoms (a=0.38 (0.28, 0.60)). In
this case, inferred exposures led to temporary protection of about 68
(56, 95) days duration, thus accounting for the longer delay between
the summer and autumn waves (Fig. 3). Over the two waves, the
cumulative incidence of symptomatic attacks for RAF personnel was
only 24.7%. R0 found support in the range 2.26–4.28. The
assumption that all RAF personnel were initially susceptible led to
a significantly worse model fit, and if all infections were additionally
assumed to be symptomatic, the model was unable to adequately
reproduce observed epidemic behaviour (See Appendix S1).
Estimates of doubling time
Initial doubling times for influenza were estimated as 0.72 days on
Tristan da Cunha and 3.93 days in RAF camps. In fully
susceptible populations, the estimated doubling times would be
0.62 days and 1.25 days respectively.
Transmissions per day
For Tristan da Cunha, there were initially 5.59 (3.20, 13.33)
transmissions per day for each transmitter, corresponding to 6.76
(3.84, 16.35) if the population were fully susceptible. For RAF
personnel, the estimates were 1.46 (1.43, 1.50) and 2.88 (2.26,
4.28) per day respectively.
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Figure 2. Incidence data and fitted model for Tristan da Cunha. Observed and fitted (median parameters) incidences for the H3N2 outbreak on the
island of Tristan da Cunha in 1971 (cases per day, starting from 15
th August). Error bars (+/2 one SD) are calculated using the negative binomial
variance (See Appendix S1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001220.g002
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Our flexible model explains multiple waves of influenza by
incorporating biological effects that have been overlooked in some
earlier pandemic models. The model allows for the possibility that
asymptomatic infection [4,9,10], pre-existing immunity, and waning
immunity or antigenic drift of the virus [4,9,10,12] could affect
transmission and disease, However, it should be emphasised that the
magnitudes of each effect in the fitted model were determined by the
data. Where an effect was missing or small, as with the low
proportion of Tristan da Cunha islanders with prior immunity, this
could be inferred from the parameter estimate (Table 1).
Seasonality [7] and social distancing measures [8,22,23] might
also explain multiple waves of influenza. However, it is unlikely
that seasonality alone can explain multiple waves occurring over
weeks to months in the absence of waning immunity, antigenic
drift and/or birth of new susceptibles. At least for seasonal
interpandemic influenza, seasonal forcing seems to determine the
timing of a new outbreak, whereas the magnitude is likely determined
by R0 and the proportion susceptible. Furthermore, as the first
wave of pandemic flu in 1918 in the UK was in summer and out of
season, it must have been triggered by ‘‘non-seasonal’’ factors (i.e.
new virus in a (partially) susceptible population). We cannot
exclude an effect of season on the timing of the second wave in
1918, nor can we exclude a role for social interventions in
explaining the gap between the first and second waves in 1918.
However, our inference that waning immunity can replenish the
Table 1. Parameters and summary statistics to explain influenza outbreaks with multiple waves.
..................................................................................................................................................
Estimated quantity RAF camps (1918)* Tristan da Cunha (1971)*
R0=average number of secondary cases from each primary case in a fully susceptible population 2.88 (2.26, 4.28) 6.44 (3.73, 10.69)
z=proportion susceptible before first wave 0.51 (0.34, 0.65) 0.84 (0.62, 0.99)
a=proportion of people with latent infections who develop symptoms 0.38 (0.28, 0.60) 0.91 (0.72, 1.00)
r=proportion of infections followed by longer-lasting protection 0.55 (0.41, 0.70) 0.49 (0.39, 0.57)
2/w=Tw=mean time (days) in temporarily resistant state after infection 68 (56, 95) 12 (9, 17)
2/c=Te=mean latent period (days) 1.30 (fixed) 1.36 (0.82, 1.87)
1/u=Ti=mean infective period (days) 1.00 (fixed) 0.98 (0.30, 1.83)
2/c+1/u =mean serial interval (days) 2.30 (fixed) 2.34 (1.56, 3.26)
Initial doubling time in fully susceptible population (days) 1.25 (0.85, 1.69) 0.62 (0.52, 0.73)
Initial doubling time in actual population (days) 3.93 (3.69, 4.19) 0.72 (0.63, 0.81)
Initial transmissions per day per transmitter in fully susceptible population 2.88 (2.26, 4.28) 6.76 (3.84, 16.35)
Initial transmissions per day per transmitter in actual population 1.46 (1.43, 1.50) 5.59 (3.20, 13.33)
*The 1918 pandemic is known to have been caused by H1N1; the 1971 outbreak on Tristan da Cunha was caused by H3N2.
Parameter values (median, 95% credibility intervals) were estimated by MCMC simulation (See Appendix S1). The estimate for the mean serial interval, the mean
doubling times and transmissions per day per transmitter were derived from the full MCMC distributions.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001220.t001
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Figure 3. Incidence data and fitted model for RAF. Observed and fitted (median parameters) incidences of influenza reported from RAF camps in UK
during the 1918 pandemic of H1N1 (cases per week, starting from week of June 8). Error bars (+/2 one SD) are calculated using the negative binomial
variance.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001220.g003
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is biologically plausible and arguably more parsimonious.
Asymptomatic influenza infections are known to be immunising
[9,10], which helps to explain why the clinical attack-rate does not
approach 100%, even in isolated, immunologically naı ¨ve popula-
tions, as in Samoa and Alaska in 1918–19 [2–4], where expected
R0 would have been high. We estimated that about 59% of
infections of susceptible RAF personnel in 1918 were asymptom-
atic, compared with only 9% on TdC in 1971. This difference
suggests that the clinical attack rate was reduced in RAF personnel
by two mechanisms–firstly by a lower proportion of susceptibles,
and secondly by the higher proportion of infections in susceptible
persons that were asymptomatic or unreported. High rates of
asymptomatic infection [9,10] with the capacity for transmission
can also help to explain why chains of influenza transmission are
often unidentifiable in inter-pandemic years, particularly in urban
settings [4,9,11].
Our results suggest that prior immunity was important in
protecting against clinical attack in the 1918 H1N1 pandemic, but
do not explain the origins of that immunity. However, hetero-
subtypic immunity likely provides at least some protection against
influenza A of novel subtype [4,12–14,24,25] and specific
antibodies against a new subtype can develop even when the
inducing infection is asymptomatic [9]. We suggest that residual
heterosubtypic immunity from the previously circulating H2 or H3
(interpandemic) viruses [4,26] might account for the apparent lack
of susceptibility in many RAF personnel before the summer wave.
However, we cannot exclude the alternative possibility that the
H1N1 virus might have circulated in less virulent form in the
spring of 1918, as was suggested for the USA [27,28], and thus
immunized some individuals against later infection. Nevertheless,
the three waves seen in 1918–19, and our detailed model for the
first and second waves, suggest that pre-existing immunity was
often short-lived, as was the immunity induced by first exposure to
the novel virus. Unfortunately, we have no evidence that would
allow us to separate the effects of waning immunity from the effects
of antigenic drift of the 1918 pandemic virus.
One result from our Tristan da Cunha model could seem
counter-intuitive: exposure in the first wave did not always protect
against re-infection in the second wave several weeks later, and
protection apparently waned much more quickly than in the RAF
population (Fig. 2 and Table 1). Re-infections over similarly short
time-intervals have also been described in an institutional
population of young and susceptible naval apprentices [1,29]
and in other historical sources [2]. We have suggested [1] that
initial viral clearance, involving innate immunity and cytokines
[30], is not immediately followed by acquired immunity, especially
in persons with little recent experience of influenza, as on TdC,
where immune priming for influenza could have been absent or
immune memory lost.
Our analyses have provided an economical explanation for the
time course of the observed data in two contrasting outbreaks.
Rather than providing inconsistent evidence, we suggest that the
two outbreaks provide complementary evidence about how
‘‘immunity’’ to influenza can evolve over different time scales
from different starting points. The dynamics of multiple-wave
outbreaks on these different time-scales are at least partly due to
the past exposure history of the population. We did not expect,
and did not observe, comparable estimates for the waning time of
immunity in the RAF and TdC populations.
Our inferred values of 2–10 for R0 are consistent with some
reports [15,22,31,32] but are greater than some estimates used for
pandemic planning [20,33–35]. The marked difference in R0
between TdC and RAF populations (Table 1) is unlikely to be due
to differences between the H3N2 virus in 1971 and the H1N1
virus in 1918, because in an isolated UK boarding school
population, we found that the 1918 virus spread with an R0 of
6.90 (See Appendix S1). We suggest therefore that the R0
difference is partly determined by differences in levels of prior
immunity, arguably through reduced levels of viral shedding from
persons with partial immunity. Differences in social mixing or
stratification of the RAF population between different camps could
also contribute to a lower R0. We note that after the arrival of the
ship from South Africa there were welcome-home parties on TdC
that could have contributed to the explosive outbreak over the first
few generations of infection (6).
For the RAF outbreaks, with data reported only at weekly time
steps, there is little information to allow MCMC estimation to
separate the effects of changing serial interval from the effects of
changing R0; likewise it was difficult to make inferences about the
relative contributions of Te and Ti to the serial interval. Table 1
provides parameter estimates and credibility intervals for RAF
analyses where Te and Ti were fixed. RAF results were similar,
although less stable when Te and Ti were constrained only by the
priors on latent period and serial interval (See Appendix S1). For
TdC, with data reported daily, information on the latent period
can be extracted by the model, which is able to resolve the subtle
timing differences that arise from trading off Te and Ti. Pleasingly,
our posterior median latent period was consistent with our prior at
1.36 days.
The estimates for the latent period from TdC simulations (See
Appendix S1) are close to published estimates of mean incubation
period (time from exposure to onset of symptoms) of 1.48 [21] or
1.9 days [20], leaving a short time window before the onset of
symptoms during which a person could be infective for others.
Our estimate of median infective period (1.01 days for TdC) is
short compared with the duration of viral shedding [1,30], and
with some other estimates of mean infective period [22]. This
discrepancy suggests that the process of infecting other people can
be terminated by isolation of cases, or by exhaustion of susceptibles
in the local environment, as well as by a decline in viral shedding.
If substantial transmission occurs before the onset of symptoms, as
suggested by others [31], this would add to the difficulties of
controlling any new pandemic.
Our flexible model, with host immunity and asymptomatic
immunising infections as the constraints on observable disease
spread, adequately reproduces the observed epidemiology of
influenza in disparate populations, and leads to additional insights
into virus behaviour. Less flexible models can explain single wave
outbreaks with a range of R0 values, but have little capacity to
estimate immune effects [1]. Indeed, several reports have implied
that it is unimportant to distinguish between R0 and effective Re,a s
it is the latter that largely determines the rate of population spread
[15,20,34]. However our model uses the additional information
from multiple wave outbreaks to draw stronger inferences about
immunity and asymptomatic infection, as well as R0 and mean
infective period.
What might our findings mean for pandemic planning? The
bad news is that the pandemic doubling time in a fully susceptible
population could be as short as 1 or 2 days, and that R0 for
a pandemic strain could be considerably higher than has been
assumed in some previous models [1]. However, the good news is
that high levels of pre-existing immunity could translate a high R0
into a much lower effective Re. Unfortunately, heterosubtypic
immunity, which can be short-lived, is likely induced more
effectively by recent infection with a live influenza virus than by
conventional sub-unit vaccines [14,24]. This raises the possibility
that inter-pandemic sub-unit vaccine, by preventing infection with
Influenza Transmission
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susceptible to a novel pandemic virus. The bottom line is that
we need much more information about heterosubtypic immunity
in humans, and about the potential value of live-attenuated
influenza vaccines against H1N1 and H3N2 in protecting
populations against H5N1 or any other novel pandemic virus.
We await the results of relevant research with great interest.
SUPPORTING INFORMATION
Appendix S1
Found at: doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0001220.s001 (0.50 MB
PDF)
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